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Abstract Evaluating the long-run consequences of present actions, as in the context
of sustainability, requires information about the actions’ outcomes and about future
preferences that is often uncertain. We analyze a risk-based criterion of sustainabil-
ity and a corresponding efficiency concept that cover these uncertainties. We derive
several properties of these criteria and formally characterize the trade-off between
sustainability and efficiency. Furthermore, we show that maximizing the probability
of ex post efficiency under a sustainability constraint provides an interesting choice
rule and that, for a special case, this rule is connected to portfolio theory.
Keywords Sustainability · Efficiency · Uncertainty · Policy evaluation ·
Portfolio choice
JEL Classification Q01 · D81 · D63 · G11
1 Introduction
One important aspect of economics is to provide information about the relative merits
of competing actions or projects. These are usually judged according to their effects
on the welfare of the affected individuals. Traditionally, the main focus has been on
evaluating and comparing actions that affect presently living individuals. But during
the past decade, the effects of present actions on future individuals have increasingly
been considered. A particular concept for this is sustainability, which holds that present
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actions should “not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs”
(Brundtland 1987).
Such an intergenerational choice problem has several characteristics that set it apart
from the problems traditionally analyzed in welfare economics and social choice the-
ory. Most importantly, future individuals are not yet in existence. So their preferences
are unknown at the time when decisions that influence their welfare have to be made.
Also, it is frequently impossible to predict the future outcomes of present actions
with certainty. Therefore, a long-run intergenerational setup demands that we evalu-
ate projects under outcome and preference uncertainty.
But most of the literature devoted to evaluating the long-run consequences of present
actions does not consider these uncertainties. Existing studies frequently employ tools
that have been developed for the traditional intratemporal setup. Thereby, some inter-
esting aspects are lost.
Most studies assume that future preferences are known with certainty today and, for
the most part, that they are identical to present preferences. Therefore, these studies
neglect the conceptually interesting aspect that sustainability implies planning for peo-
ple that we do not know. Furthermore, neglecting preference uncertainty has facilitated
the use of welfare comparisons between present and future individuals. As Krysiak
and Krysiak (2006) argued, this becomes impossible if there is substantial uncertainty
w.r.t. future preferences. So an evaluation of the long-term consequences of a project
should avoid intergenerational welfare comparisons.
Also, neglecting uncertainty has led to the perhaps unwarranted assumption that we
are able to assure that we do not harm future individuals. Under uncertainty, assuring
such a deterministic version of sustainability is at least costly (in terms of foregone
present and expected future welfare) if not even impossible. So the focus should rather
be on balancing the risk of harming future individuals with the risk of rejecting projects
that are beneficial to present and potentially to future individuals. This indicates that
under uncertainty, the relation between sustainability and efficiency is important and
should be addressed in terms of risks.
In this article, we consider the question of how the consequences of present actions
for future individuals can be evaluated if future preferences and outcomes are uncertain
and if intergenerational welfare comparisons are infeasible. For this, we use the risk-
based concept of sustainability advanced in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006) as well as a
similar risk-based efficiency criterion. We first prove some general characteristics of
these concepts. We then investigate the relation between sustainability and efficiency
and analyze a choice rule that minimizes the conflict between these criteria.
Our results indicate that such a risk-based approach provides a content-rich and
yet mathematically convenient framework for analyzing decision problems with long-
run consequences. The main definitions on which our analysis is based are shown
to have mathematically convenient convexity and continuity properties that facilitate
their integration into economic analysis. Furthermore, although there is an inherent
conflict between sustainability and efficiency, our risk-based framework allows to
replace the incompatibility of these concepts often found in deterministic models with
a gradual choice between an efficiency-focused and a distribution-centered approach
to intertemporal planning. Finally, minimizing the risk of ex post inefficiency under
a sustainability constraint provides an economically intuitive and mathematically
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convenient choice rule with a connection to the efficient frontier of mean–variance
analysis.
In the following two sections, we briefly review the literature on sustainability under
uncertainty, advance our framework, and analyze a risk-based concept of sustainability.
In Sect. 4, we examine the trade-off between sustainability and efficiency. In Sect. 5,
we consider a special case in which our analysis can be connected to portfolio theory.
Section 6 discusses the limitations of our analysis as well as some generalizations,
Sect. 7 provides an example, and Sect. 8 concludes the article.
2 Sustainability under uncertainty
Several groups of studies have considered uncertainty in the context of sustainability
or, more general, in the context of evaluating policies with long-run consequences.
Going back to Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Fisher and Krutilla (1974), there is an
extensive literature that analyzes the effects of uncertainty in the context of project
evaluation. This literature shows that the conjunction of uncertainty and irreversibility
implies the existence of a quasi-option value, which can have a substantial influence on
a project’s preferability. However, these studies proceed in an aggregative framework
that abstracts from distributional concerns. Thus, they are only distantly connected to
the intergenerational distribution problem analyzed here.
Closer to our framework are studies that analyze sustainability under outcome
uncertainty, such as Woodward (2000) and Asheim and Brekke (2002), or preference
uncertainty, such as Heal et al. (1998), Ayong Le Kama (2001), Ayong Le Kama and
Schubert (2004), and Krysiak and Krysiak (2006). Asheim and Brekke (2002) consid-
ered outcome uncertainty by introducing stochastic changes to capital and resource
stocks into a concept of non-declining welfare.1 Woodward (2000) also addresses
outcome uncertainty but uses a concept of sustainability that is based on the notion
of fairness advanced in Foley (1967).2 Heal et al. (1998), Ayong Le Kama (2001),
and Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2004) derived decision rules for sustainable devel-
opment for a special case of preference uncertainty where preferences change in an
uncertain direction at a (possibly) uncertain future time. Finally, Krysiak and Krysiak
(2006) analyzed an envy-based criterion of sustainability in the context of a more
general form of preference uncertainty.
Albeit these studies introduce uncertainty either as outcome or as preference uncer-
tainty, this difference is in itself not substantial from a conceptual point of view;
whether future well-being is uncertain due to unpredictable future consumption pos-
sibilities or due to unpredictable future preferences is merely a question of model
details.
However, Krysiak and Krysiak (2006) argued that this holds only for limited forms
of preference uncertainty. If future preferences can deviate substantially from present
1 Non-declining welfare is axiomatically derived as a criterion of sustainability in a deterministic context
in Asheim et al. (2001). The underlying approach to intergenerational justice is extended in Asheim and
Tungodden (2004).
2 Similar criteria are also used in Riley (1980) and Howarth (1995).
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preferences, it is not adequate to presume that future and present generations share a
concept of well-being. Thus, welfare comparisons across generations are not feasible
if there is substantial preference uncertainty. To avoid such comparisons, they advance
a definition of sustainability that requires that the probability of harming future indi-
viduals is limited. Thereby, harm is defined as envy w.r.t. a status-quo situation, so
that this definition does not rely on intergenerational welfare comparisons.
The concept is similar to that used in Woodward (2000) but uses a one-way notion
of fairness (it is not required that present individuals do not envy future individuals),
is based on actual outcomes and preferences instead of expected future welfare (and
therefore corresponds to a different ethical view on intergenerational risk sharing),
and avoids intergenerational welfare comparisons. Krysiak and Krysiak showed that
this criterion of sustainability generalizes weak and strong sustainability as well as
non-declining welfare. They argued that this approach is preferable to an expected-
utility-based concept because it encompasses frequently used sustainability concepts
and because the risk of harming future individuals can approach 100% in the expected
utility framework, which seems to be ethically untenable.
In this article, we use the sustainability concept advanced in Krysiak and Krysiak
(2006) for three reasons. First and most importantly, it avoids intergenerational welfare
comparisons and is thus applicable in the context of substantial preference uncertainty.
Second, it encompasses several frequently used sustainability concepts. Finally, as we
show below, it provides an interesting possibility to characterize the trade-off between
sustainability and efficiency.
3 Characterizing sustainable actions
We consider a setting where a present decision influences the welfare of future indi-
viduals but where this influence cannot be predicted with certainty because both the
effects of the present decision on future situations and the preferences according to
which future individuals will assess their situation are uncertain. For simplicity, we
restrict our analysis to the case where there is only one future generation that consists
of a single individual and where there is only one presently living individual. As we
argue in Sect. 6, extending our analysis to more applicable settings is easily possible.
Let A˜ ⊂ Rn be a bounded set of a finite number of actions. We assume that in
addition to these actions, all their convex combinations are feasible. If we analyze, for
example, a land-use decision, this assumption implies that the land can be partitioned
and each partition used for a different alternative. So the set of feasible actions is the
convex hull of A˜, which we denote by A. Observe that by construction, A is convex
and compact.
Let denote by s ∈ S ⊆ Rq a random variable that describes the future state of
nature. Let t ∈ T ⊆ Rp be the type of the future individual, which is also uncertain
from the perspective of the present. We depict the preferences of the future individual
over the outcomes of present actions in dependency of the state of nature and the
type of the individual by defining a preference relation  on A × S × T , which is
similar to the master preferences used in Howe (1987). Furthermore, we assume that
a function P(Q) exists that measures the probability that (s, t) ∈ Q ⊆ S × T and
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that this probability has a density φ(s, t), which implies that P is differentiable and
thus continuous. For notational simplicity, we define z := (s, t) and Z := S × T .
This notational simplification might suggest that our model is equivalent to a model
with only outcome uncertainty. However, there is an important difference. If only out-
comes are uncertain, welfare comparisons over differing values of z involve only a
comparison of different states. With preference uncertainty, they can involve intergen-
erational welfare comparisons, which are infeasible if there is substantial preference
uncertainty. Thus although the distinction between outcome and preference uncer-
tainty is notationally dispensable, it is important to keep in mind that, in contrast to
a model with only outcome uncertainty, we cannot compare welfare levels across all
elements of z because we have to avoid intergenerational welfare comparisons.
As discussed in the preceding section, a possible criterion for sustainability that
avoids intergenerational welfare comparisons and that is applicable to the context of
uncertainty is given in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006). Following this approach, we define
sustainability as the obligation to keep the probability of harming future individuals
within reasonable bounds. Thereby, a future individual is “harmed” whenever an action
results in an outcome that is, according to the preferences of this individual, strictly
inferior to a status-quo.
We do not elaborate on the choice of this status-quo, because for our formal analysis,
it suffices that an action that result in this status quo can be defined. Note, however,
that together with setting the level of sustainability, which we introduce below, the
choice of the status-quo action determines the ethical implications of this concept of
sustainability. Since in many cases, the status-quo action will correspond to an action
that leaves the distribution of the future states of the world unchanged, we denote it
by 0.
So, a future individual of type t is “harmed” by the action a in state s, if (0, z) 
(a, z) with z = (s, t), that is, if the individual would strictly prefer the status-quo
outcome to the outcome of the action given the future state of nature s. The probability
that the action a harms the future individual is given by
ω(a) := P(Σ(a)), (1)
with
Σ(a) := {z ∈ Z|(0, z)  (a, z)}. (2)
Following Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), we define sustainability as the requirement
that the probability of harming the future individual is bounded by a constant α. Thus,
for a given value of α, the set of sustainable actions is
Ωα := {a ∈ A|ω(a) ≤ α}. (3)
To characterize Ωα , we use the following assumptions:
A1 Preferences are complete, transitive, and continuous w.r.t. (a, z) ∈ A × Z .
A2 If (a1, z1)  (b, z1) and (a2, z2)  (b, z2), then (λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, λz1 +
(1 − λ)z2)  (b, λz1 + (1 − λ)z2) for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
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A3 Z is a convex set that contains at least two elements.
A4 The density φ(z) is convex unimodal, that is, for all c ≥ 0, the level sets {z ∈
Z|φ(z) ≥ c} are either empty or convex sets.
For some results, we need stronger conditions.
A4* If z1, z2 ∈ {z ∈ Z|φ(z) ≥ c} for some c ≥ 0, then φ(λz1 + (1 − λ)z2) > c
for all λ ∈]0, 1[.
A4** φ(z) is concave in z ∈ Z .
Assumption A1 is standard in economic analysis. A2 restricts the influence of outcome
and preference uncertainty on the future evaluation of the outcomes of present actions.
It implies that if there are two actions a1, a2 that are weakly preferred to an action
b for some future state and type combinations z1 and z2, respectively, then a convex
combination of these actions is preferred to b for the corresponding convex combi-
nation of the states and types. This assumption holds, for example, if preferences are
convex w.r.t. a and quasi-linear w.r.t. z.
Assumption A3 implies that if two states or two types are possible, a convex com-
bination of these states or types is not impossible per se.
Assumption A4 is one of several extensions of the concept of a unimodal density
to the multivariate case, see Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988). It excludes cases
in which several distinct combinations of future states and types are likely with “in
between” scenarios being less probable. It implies that φ(z) is a quasi-concave function
of z ∈ Z .
The stronger assumption A4* guarantees that the density of the probability distri-
bution has a unique maximum, that is, there is a single scenario that is regarded as the
most likely one. It rules out “plateaus” of φ(z) by demanding that the interior of any
level set is a subset of some higher level set. But A4* does not specify how strongly the
likelihood of a scenario decreases, if we move away from the most plausible scenario.
Such a constraint is implicit in A4**, which sets a lower bound to this decrease; the
likelihood of a scenario can at most change linearly with the distance to any other
scenario. An example for a distribution that meets A4* is the normal distribution.
Examples for A4** are the uniform and the triangular distribution, the latter of which
meets both A4* and A4**. Note that both A4* and A4** imply A4, but neither of
them implies or excludes the other. Furthermore, A4* does not constrain Z , whereas
A4** is only feasible if this set is bounded.
Given the above assumptions, it is clear that the essential aspect of our setup is
the convexity of all relevant sets, functions, and relations. Assumption A3 and our
construction of A ensure that the set of action, the set of types, and the set of states of
natures are convex. Assumption A2 is most easily met if preferences are convex in a
and quasi-linear in z. Assumptions A4, A4*, and A4** imply that the density function
φ is at least quasi-concave.
We start our analysis by proving the following basic result.
Proposition 1 Under A1–A4 and for all α ∈ [0, 1], Ωα is a convex and compact set
with 0 ∈ Ωα and Ω1 = A.
Proof That 0 ∈ Ωα and Ω1 = A follow directly from (1)–(3). For α = 1, convexity
holds trivially because Ωα = A is convex. So let α ∈ [0, 1[. If Ωα contains only
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a single element, it is trivially convex. Otherwise, choose a1, a2 ∈ Ωα and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Let aλ := λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, which is an element of A, since A is convex. Consider
z1 /∈ Σ(a1) and z2 /∈ Σ(a2), which exist due to α < 1, and let zλ := λz1 + (1−λ)z2.
By A3, zλ ∈ Z . A2 implies that (aλ, zλ)  (0, zλ), so that zλ /∈ Σ(aλ).
Let Σ¯(a) denote the complement of Σ(a) in Z for some a ∈ A. By using all
combinations of z1 ∈ Σ¯(a1) and z2 ∈ Σ¯(a2), we can define Σ¯λ := {λz1 + (1 −
λ)z2|z1 ∈ Σ¯(a1), z2 ∈ Σ¯(a2)} and get Σ¯λ ⊆ Σ¯(aλ).
Now let z¯ be a point of Σ¯(a1)∪ Σ¯(a2) where φ(z) attains its maximum on this set.
Assume without loss of generality that z¯ ∈ Σ¯(a1). By A4, all points λz¯+(1−λ)z˜ are an
element of all level sets that contain z˜. By choosing subsequently all z˜ ∈ Σ¯(a2), we thus
get a set of points H := {λz¯ + (1−λ)z˜|z˜ ∈ Σ¯(a2)} with P(H) ≥ P(Σ¯(a2)) ≥ 1−α.
By construction, H ⊆ Σ¯λ. Therefore, P(Σ¯λ)≥ P(Σ¯(a2))≥ 1−α. So P(Σ(aλ)) ≤ α
and thus aλ ∈ Ωα .
The compactness of Ωα follows from (3), P being continuous and A being bounded.
	unionsq
Proposition 1 reveals an important property of the above definition of sustainability.
If two actions are sustainable at some level α, then all combinations of these actions
are also sustainable at α. Especially, if an action a is sustainable at some α ∈ [0, 1],
then a downscaled action λa with 0 ≤ λ < 1 is also sustainable at α.
Under the assumption A4*, we get the stronger result that combining or down-
scaling actions actually increases the level of sustainability. By assuming A4**, we
gain information about the sustainability of a convex combination of actions that are
sustainable at different levels.
Proposition 2 Assume A1–A3 and A4*. Let a1, a2 ∈ Ωα with α > 0. Then for all
λ ∈]0, 1[, we have λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ Ωα˜ with α˜ < α.
Assume A1–A3 and A4** and let a1 ∈ Ωα1 and a2 ∈ Ωα2 . Then, for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
we have λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ Ωλα1+(1−λ)α2 .
Proof The proof proceeds similarly to that of Proposition 1. The difference is that
under A4*, we get P(H) > P(Σ¯(a2)) ≥ 1−α, because for every point of Σ¯(a2), the
corresponding point of H lies in a higher level set. So we have P(Σ¯λ) > P(Σ¯(a2)) ≥
1−α and thus the assertion follows. Under A4**, we can assure P(H) ≥ λP(Σ¯(a1))+
(1 − λ)P(Σ¯(a2)), so that λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ Ωλα1+(1−λ)α2 . 	unionsq
Proposition 2 is remarkable because assumption A4* is met by distributions that are
frequently used to model expectations, like the multivariate normal distribution. Thus,
under widely used modeling assumptions, a linear combination of two sustainable
actions results in a lower risk of harming the future individual than each of the two
original actions. This indicates a connection to portfolio choice, where diversification
is used as a means to reduce risks. We elaborate on this in Sect. 5.
The part of Proposition 2 that holds under A4** is important because it provides
information concerning how the achievable level of sustainability changes if we com-
bine two actions. This result will be helpful for characterizing the trade-off between
sustainability and efficiency in Sect. 4.
The final result of this section provides some further information about the above
concept of sustainability.
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Proposition 3 Under A1–A4, we have Ωα1 ⊆ Ωα2 for α1 ≤ α2. If in addition A4*
holds, then Ωα : [0, 1] → A is a continuous map of α.
Proof Ωα1 ⊆ Ωα2 for α1 ≤ α2 is a consequence of (1)–(3), because if a ∈ Ωα , then
a ∈ Ωα˜ , ∀α˜ ≥ α.
Let a ∈ int (Ωα), which implies that there exists an ε > 0, so that a + ε ∈ Ωα and
a−ε ∈ Ωα . Under A4*, Proposition 2 assures that a1 := (1/2)a+(1/2)(a−ε) ∈ Ωα˜
and a2 := (1/2)a + (1/2)(a + ε) ∈ Ωα˜ with some α˜ < α. By Proposition 1, Ωα˜
is convex, so that a = (1/2)a1 + (1/2)a2 ∈ Ωα˜ . So if a ∈ int (Ωα), then there
exists an α˜ < α with a ∈ Ωα˜ . Since Ωα1 ⊆ Ωα2 for α1 ≤ α2, we trivially have
a ∈ int (Ωα) ⇒ a ∈ Ωα˜ for α˜ > α. So given that by Proposition 1, Ωα is a closed set
for all α ∈ [0, 1], Ωα : [0, 1] → A is continuous map. 	unionsq
Proposition 3 shows that small changes to the level of sustainability α result only in
small changes to the set of sustainable actions. Thus, there are no thresholds at which
slightly altering α enforces drastic changes to hitherto sustainable actions.
So far, our analysis has shown that the concept of sustainability advanced in Krysiak
and Krysiak (2006) provides a mathematically convenient framework for analyzing
questions of intergenerational distribution. The compactness, convexity, and continuity
properties proven above assure that the concept integrates easily into optimization
frameworks and thus into economic analysis.
4 Sustainability and efficiency
In analogy to the relation between type I and type II errors in statistical test theory,
we can expect that reducing the risk of harming a future individual increases the
probability of foregoing actions that would have benefited everyone. So, there might
be a trade-off between sustainability and efficiency.
In models with uncertainty, two efficiency concepts, namely, ex ante and ex post
efficiency are commonly used. In our context, neither of these concepts is directly
useful. Ex ante efficiency is based on expected outcomes, whereas we use a definition
of sustainability that is based on actual outcomes. Thus, ex ante efficiency corresponds
to a different ethical view on intergenerational risk sharing than our sustainability con-
cept. Consequently, comparing these concepts may be mathematically feasible,3 but
it is conceptually uninteresting, because comparing two normative concepts by using
versions of these concepts that are based on fundamentally different premises does
not yield reliable information about the compatibility of the concepts in general. Fur-
thermore, in many applications, an interesting question is whether “protecting” future
generations reduces the likelihood that projects are pursued would have increased
present and future welfare. To address this question, an ex post evaluation of actions
is necessary, which rules out ex ante efficiency.
3 Indeed, Propositions 1 and 3 guarantee that, under A1–A3 and A4*, there exists a minimal level of α for
which an ex ante efficient action is sustainable (By Proposition 1, all ex ante efficient actions are sustainable
for α = 1 and the continuity proven in Proposition 3 implies that there is a lowest value of α in [0, 1] for
which at least one ex ante efficient action is an element of Ωα). Thus, ex ante efficiency and our notion of
sustainability are compatible, whenever the sustainability requirement is not too strict.
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The notion of ex post efficiency is more natural in our context; being based on
actual outcomes, it is conceptually similar to the definition of sustainability used here.
However, in our setup, actions have to be chosen under informational constraints. Thus,
it is unlikely that there exists an action that is ex post efficient with certainty. Therefore,
we use a weakened concept of ex post efficiency by considering the probability that
an action leads to an ex post efficient outcome. This results in a concept of efficiency
that is closely related to the above definition of sustainability.
To characterize efficiency in our model, we need information concerning present
preferences. We assume that present preferences are certain and can be depicted by
the above-defined “master” preferences for t = t0 ∈ T . Furthermore, we assume that
there is no uncertainty w.r.t. the present outcomes of an action. The present state of
nature shall be s0 ∈ S. For notational simplicity, we set z0 := (s0, t0).
We define the probability that an action is ex post Pareto inferior to another action
by
ξ(a) := P(Σ˜(a)), (4)
with
Σ˜(a) := {z ∈ Z|∃b ∈ A with ((b, z)  (a, z) ∧ (b, z0)  (a, z0))
∨ ((b, z)  (a, z) ∧ (b, z0)  (a, z0))}. (5)
So, ξ(a) measures the probability that an action a is ex post Pareto dominated by some
other action b. As in (3), we can define level sets of A w.r.t. to this measure.
Ξβ := {a ∈ A|ξ(a) ≤ β}. (6)
Thus, Ξβ is the set of actions whose probability of being ex post inefficient is at most
β. Note that in contrast to Ωα , which is non-empty for all α ∈ [0, 1], it is possible that
Ξβ = ∅ for some β ∈ [0, 1].
As in the preceding section, our assumptions assure that this set has convenient
properties.
Proposition 4 Assume A1–A4. Then, there exists a βmin ∈ [0, 1] so that for all
β ≥ βmin, we have Ξβ = ∅, and for all β < βmin, we have Ξβ = ∅. Furthermore,
Ξβ is a convex and compact set for all β ∈ [βmin, 1] and we have Ξβ1 ⊆ Ξβ2 for
β1 ≤ β2 as well as Ξ1 = A.
If in addition A4* holds, then a1, a2 ∈ Ξβ with β > βmin implies λa1 +(1−λ)a2 ∈
Ξβ˜ with β˜ < β, for all λ ∈]0, 1[, as well as that Ξβ : [βmin, 1] → A is a continuousfunction of β.
If A1–A3 and A4** hold, then a1 ∈ Ξβ1 and a2 ∈ Ξβ2 imply λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈
Ξλβ1+(1−λ)β2 for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof By (4) and (5), ξ(a) ∈ [0, 1] is a continuous function of a ∈ A because A is
convex and P as well as  are continuous. So, ξ(a) attains its minimum on the compact
set A. This minimum equals βmin: For β < βmin, we have Ξβ = ∅, for β = βmin, the
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definition of βmin assures that there is at least one a ∈ Ξβ , so that Ξβ = ∅, and for
β > βmin, Ξβmin ⊆ Ξβ , which directly results from (6), implies Ξβ = ∅.
Compactness follows from (6) and A being bounded. For β = 1, convexity is trivial
because Ξ1 = A is convex. For β ∈ [βmin, 1[, we can find z1 /∈ Σ˜(a1), z2 /∈ Σ˜(a2)
for all a1, a2 ∈ Ξβ (if Ξβ contains only a single element, we do not have to prove
convexity; it holds trivially). By A2, we have zλ /∈ Σ˜(aλ) with aλ := λa1 + (1−λ)a2
and zλ := λz1 + (1 − λ)z2 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. With this information, the proofs of
Propositions 1–3 can be transferred directly to yield the assertions. 	unionsq
Proposition 4 shows that the mathematical properties derived for the set of sustain-
able actions Ωα also hold for the set of actions for which the probability that they turn
out to be ex post inefficient, is at most β.
To inquire in how far our definitions of sustainability and efficiency are compatible,
we define
 := {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]|Ωα ∩ Ξβ = ∅}. (7)
Thus,  is the set of all combinations of α and β that are simultaneously supported
by at least one feasible action. To characterize this set, it is helpful to define its lower
boundary:
β∗(α) := min{β ∈ [0, 1]|Ωα ∩ Ξβ = ∅}. (8)
The following proposition provides some information concerning  and β∗(α).
Proposition 5 Assume A1–A4. Then,  is compact. Furthermore, if (α, β) ∈ , then
(α˜, β˜) ∈  for all α ≤ α˜ ≤ 1, β ≤ β˜ ≤ 1. Also, β∗(α) is defined for all α ∈ [0, 1]
and is a decreasing function of α with β∗(1) = βmin.
Under A1–A3 and A4**,  is in addition a convex set.
Under A1–A3 and A4*, β∗(α) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is in addition a continuous function
and is strictly decreasing in α for all α ∈ [0, 1] with β∗(α) > βmin.
Proof By construction,  is bounded. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be given. By Proposition 1, Ωα is
convex and compact, so that the continuous function ξ(a) attains its minimum on Ωα .
Thus, for a given α, the set of β with (α, β) ∈  is closed. Since α ∈ [0, 1],  is also
closed and thus compact. Furthermore, due to Ξ1 = A, there is always a β ∈ [0, 1]
with Ωα ∩ Ξβ = ∅. So given the continuity of ξ(a) and the compactness of , β∗(α)
is well defined for all α ∈ [0, 1].
(α, β) ∈  ⇒ (α˜, β˜) ∈  for all α˜ ≥ α, β˜ ≥ β follows from Ξβ1 ⊆ Ξβ2 , for
β1 ≤ β2, and Ωα1 ⊆ Ωα2 , for α1 ≤ α2 (Propositions 3 and 4).
If (α1, β1), (α2, β2) ∈ , then there exist a1, a2 with a1 ∈ Ωα1 ∩ Ξβ1 and a2 ∈
Ωα2 ∩Ξβ2 . Under A4**, Propositions 2 and 4 imply λa1 + (1−λ)a2 ∈ Ωλα1+(1−λ)α2
and λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ Ξλβ1+(1−λ)β2 , so that Ωλα1+(1−λ)α2 ∩ Ξλβ1+(1−λ)β2 = ∅ and
therefore (λα1 + (1 − λ)α2, λβ1 + (1 − λ)β2) ∈ . So under A4**,  is convex.
By Proposition 3, we have Ωα1 ⊆ Ωα2 for α1 ≤ α2, so that β∗(α) is decreasing in
α. Since Ω1 = A, we have β∗(1) = βmin by the definition of βmin.
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Under A4*, β∗(α) is a continuous function, because by Propositions 3 and 4, Ωα
and Ξβ are continuous maps and ξ(a) is a continuous function.
Finally under A4*, Ξβ∗(α) contains strictly more than a single element for all
α ∈ [0, 1] with β∗(α) > βmin (otherwise Ξβ˜ would be empty for all β˜ < β∗(α)
contradicting β∗(α) > βmin). By Proposition 6 below (which is independent from the
current proof), only one of these elements can also be an element of Ωα . So there exists
an a˜ ∈ Ξβ∗(α) with a˜ /∈ Ωα but a˜ ∈ Ωα˜ for some α˜>α. By the definition ofβ∗(α), there
also exists an a ∈ Ξβ∗(α) ∩ Ωα , which (by Proposition 4 and the definition of β∗(α))
must be an element of the boundary of Ωα . Therefore, aλ := λa + (1 − λ)a˜ /∈ Ωα for
all λ ∈ ]0, 1[. Since aλ ∈ Ωα˜ , the continuity of Ωα as a function of α assures that for all
αλ ∈ ]α, α˜[, there is a λ ∈]0, 1[ so that aλ ∈ Ωαλ . By construction, aλ ∈ int
(
Ξβ∗(α)
)
for all λ ∈ ]0, 1[. Thus by Proposition 4, there exists a βλ < β∗(α) so that aλ ∈ Ξβλ . In
conclusion, if β∗(α) > βmin, then there exists an ε > 0, so that for all αλ ∈ ]α, α+ ε],
there is a βλ < β∗(α) with (αλ, βλ) ∈ . Consequently, β∗(α) is strictly decreasing
in α. 	unionsq
Proposition 5 has several important implications. There is a monotonic relation
between the probability of harming future individuals and the probability of not pur-
suing actions that would benefit everyone. Under A4*, this relation is even strictly
monotonic until the minimal achievable level of β is reached: demanding more sus-
tainability implies that we get less efficiency. Since we have imposed no restrictions
on the set of possible actions or on present or future preferences that could explain this
trade-off, this result indicates that there is an inherent incompatibility of efficiency
and sustainability.
Under A4*, this trade-off has a convenient continuity property: small changes to
the level of sustainability result only in small changes to the probability of efficiency.
Finally, under A4**, the set  is convex, implying that increasing requirements of
sustainability necessitate non-decreasing marginal sacrifices in terms of efficiency.
It is possible to use the above results to characterize a special set of actions, which
we refer to as “most efficient sustainable actions” (MESA):
MESA: a∗(α) := {a ∈ Ωα ∩ Ξβ∗(α)}.
In the concept of a “most efficient sustainable action,” we first limit the risk of
harming future individuals by setting α and then choose those actions for which the
risk that they turn out to be ex post inefficient is minimized. In other words, a MESA
is an action for which the type I error (allowing an action that harms the future indi-
vidual) is constrained and the type II error (rejecting an action that is beneficial for
all) is minimized under this constraint. This is similar to Woodward (2000), where
sustainability is used as a constraint in a welfare maximization.
The following proposition characterizes these actions.
Proposition 6 Under A1–A3 and A4*, a∗(α) : [0, 1] → A is well defined for all
α ∈ [0, 1] and is a single-valued, continuous function of α.
Proof Due to 0 ∈ Ωα ∀α ∈ [0, 1] and by the definition of β∗(α), the set a∗(α) is
non-empty ∀α ∈ [0, 1], so that a∗(α) is well defined.
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Now assume that a∗(α) would be a set with strictly more than one element. Then
we would have a1, a2 ∈ a∗(α) and by Propositions 1 and 4, we would have aλ :=
λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ a∗(α). By Proposition 4, aλ ∈ Ξβ˜ with β˜ < β∗(α) for λ ∈]0, 1[,
which contradicts the definition of β∗(α). Therefore, a∗(α) has to be single valued.
The continuity of a∗(α) follows from that of Ωα , Ξβ , and β∗(α). 	unionsq
Proposition 6 shows that defining “most efficient sustainable actions” is feasible
for all α ∈ [0, 1] and that this concept identifies exactly one action for every value of
α. Furthermore, small changes to the level of sustainability induce only small changes
to the “most efficient sustainable action.”
We could also first set a probability of achieving ex post efficiency and then mini-
mize the risk of harming the future individual under this constraint. This would result
in a function a¯∗(β). As can be easily shown, this is simply a dual representation of
a∗(α). For β ∈ [βmin, 1], a so defined function has properties that closely resemble
the above proven ones of a∗(α).
Altogether, the analysis of this section has shown that there is an inherent trade-off
between sustainability and ex post efficiency and that this conflict can be conve-
niently formalized and characterized in a risk-based framework. Indeed, the uncer-
tainty is helpful in this context in that it allows for a smooth transition between an
efficiency-focused and a distribution-centered approach. The trade-off between effi-
ciency and sustainability can be minimized by considering only “most efficient sus-
tainable actions,” which is an economically intuitive and, by Proposition 6, also a
mathematically convenient choice rule.
5 Sustainability through Diversification
Propositions 2 and 4 have shown that diversification, in the sense of combining actions,
reduces the risk of being unsustainable as well as that of being ex post inefficient. This
indicates a connection to portfolio theory, where diversification is used to reduce the
overall risk of a portfolio.
In this section, we explore the connection of our framework to mean–variance
analysis. We have chosen this particular concept of portfolio theory because it yields
an interesting connection to our concept and mean–variance analysis is increasingly
used in environmental economics to address problems of designing or evaluating
policies with long-lasting consequences. For example, Baldursson and Magnusson
(1997) and Edwards et al. (2004) used mean–variance analysis in the context of fishery
management, and Springer (2003) analyzed the question in how far investments into
climate change mitigation should be diversified across countries with a mean–variance
approach.
These studies directly employ a mean–variance criterion for policy evaluation with-
out formally addressing the question of how such a criterion can be justified in the
normative context of policy evaluation. We inquire whether a risk-based sustainabil-
ity concept can provide a theoretical foundation for such applications by instating a
connection between policy evaluation and portfolio choice.
We establish such a connection albeit only under restrictive assumptions on
preference and outcome uncertainty. These assumptions are frequently used in
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mean–variance analysis but have been empirically refuted in many applications in
finance. As we discuss below, they are also disputable in our context, except for a
special case.
We need two additional assumptions. These are most easily stated in terms of utility,
which is possible, because A1 implies the existence of a utility function u(a, z) and
thus of a utility difference ∆u(a, z) := u(a, z) − u(0, z). Note that this difference
does not include a utility comparison between types but only between actions.
A5 For all a ∈ A, ∆u(a, z) is a normally distributed random variable with expecta-
tion µ(a) and variance σ 2(a) that both depend continuously on a ∈ A.
A6 If µ(a1) ≥ µ(a2), then u(a1, z0) ≥ u(a2, z0), and vice versa.
A5 imposes a specific functional form on the probability of future types and situations.
It implies A4*, but it is not compatible with A4**. As Samuelson (1970) has shown,
A5 holds approximately, if the uncertainty is sufficiently small.
Assumption A6 implies that an increase in expected future benefits is also beneficial
for the present generation, and vice versa. It resembles a scenario where the probability
that future conditions and preferences diverge only slightly from present ones is not
too small and where there is no genuine conflict of interest, that is, where presently
beneficial actions are also in the interest of the future individual, if its situation and
its preferences are close to present ones. This assumption excludes deterministic dis-
tributional conflicts. In Sect. 6, we discuss how such conflicts can be reintegrated.
Note that by A5, the influence of the variance σ 2(a) on the risk of harming the
future individual depends on µ(a): for a constant µ(a) > 0, this risk is increasing in
σ 2(a), whereas for a constant µ(a) < 0, this risk is decreasing in σ 2(a). To avoid
case distinctions, we specialize to the case µ(a) ≥ 0. Since under A5, it is necessary
to have µ(a) ≥ 0 for a ∈ Ω0.5 and since a risk of more than 50% of harming future
individuals is hardly compatible with an ethically tenable notion of sustainability, this
restriction seems to be a reasonable simplification.
We are interested in establishing a connection between the above risk-based concept
of sustainability and the efficient frontier of mean–variance analysis. The efficient
frontier is the minimal variance σ 2(a) achievable for a given expected value µ(a):
σ 2eff(µ) := min
a∈A
σ 2(a) with µ(a) = µ. (9)
Usually, σ 2eff will have up- and downward sloping parts. But for our analysis, only the
strictly upward sloping parts are relevant. These are given by
Ψ :=
{
(µ, σ 2) ∈ R × R+|µ = max σ 2eff−1(σ 2)
}
, (10)
where σ 2eff
−1
(σ 2) denotes the (usually set-valued and possibly empty) pre-image of
σ 2eff(µ) for σ
2
eff = σ 2. We refer to actions that lead to points on the upward sloping
part of the efficient frontier as “efficient frontier actions” (EFA).
EFA: A× :=
{
a ∈ A|(µ(a), σ 2(a)) ∈ Ψ
}
.
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The following proposition connects these “efficient frontier actions” with the “most
efficient sustainable actions” introduced in the preceding section.
Proposition 7 Assume A1–A3, A4*, and A5–A6. Then, the set A∗ := {a∗(α)|0 ≤ α ≤
0.5} of “most efficient sustainable actions” with α ≤ 0.5 is a compact and connected
subset of the set A×∩{a ∈ A|µ(a) ≥ 0} of “efficient frontier actions” with µ(a) ≥ 0.
Proof Assume that there is an a1 ∈ A with a1 ∈ a∗(α), for some α ∈ [0, 0.5], but
a1 /∈ A×. Then, there exists an a2 ∈ A with µ(a2) > µ(a1) and σ 2(a2) = σ 2(a1).
But by A5 and A6, σ 2(a2) = σ 2(a1) and µ(a2) > µ(a1) imply that if a1 ∈ Ωα ∩Ξβ ,
then a2 ∈ Ωα˜ ∩Ξβ with α˜ < α. Therefore, a1 ∈ a∗(α) is contradicted. So, a ∈ a∗(α)
implies a ∈ A×. Thus every MESA is an EFA and since by A5, µ(a) ≥ 0 is necessary
for a ∈ Ω0.5, we have A∗ := {a∗(α)|0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5} ⊆ A× ∩ {a ∈ A|µ(a) ≥ 0}.
Furthermore, by Proposition 6, a∗(α) is a continuous function of α. Therefore A∗,
being the image of the compact and connected interval [0, 0.5] under a∗(α), is a
compact and connected set. 	unionsq
Proposition 7 indicates a link between sustainability under uncertainty and portfolio
theory. This implies that we can transfer results from mean–variance analysis (see,
e.g., Markowitz and Todd 1987) to the context of policy evaluation and that a risk-
based concept of sustainability provides a theoretical basis on which mean–variance
analysis can be used for policy evaluation. In addition, it is possible to derive a set of
candidates for “most efficient sustainable actions” by calculating the efficient frontier.
As noted above, Assumptions A5 and A6 are highly restrictive. Whereas Assump-
tion A6 can be relaxed (see Sect. 6), Assumption A5 is crucial for the above result.
As shown by Samuelson (1970), it can be seen as an approximation for low levels
of uncertainty. But in other cases, it is questionable whether future welfare effects
of present actions are normally distributed. Furthermore, this question is not easily
answered empirically because it refers to expectations over possible future states.4
Thus, applying Proposition 7 will mainly be possible in cases where the uncertainty
is sufficiently small, so that A5 holds approximately.
6 Limitations and extensions
We have intentionally constrained our analysis to a simple setup that contains only
one present and one future individual. This framework has facilitated a clear focus
on the problem of distributing risks between individuals. But it deviates from the
setup in which sustainability is commonly discussed, which consists of a sequence of
(possibly overlapping) generations. Whether our analysis can be extended to such a
setup is thus an important question. Also, we have excluded deterministic distributional
problems from the analysis in Sect. 5 and have not addressed the question of whether
our assumptions on preferences and expectations can be relaxed. In this section, we
briefly discuss these points.
Consider a number N of future individuals, possibly living in different periods,
and let φ(z1, . . . , zN ) be a density that characterizes the likelihood of a particular
4 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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assignment of types and states of natures to these individuals and the times at which
they live. We can define Ωα as the set of actions for which the probability that at least
one of the N individuals is harmed, is at most α. Similarly, the set Ξβ can be defined
as the set of actions for which the probability that they turn out to be Pareto dominated
according to the preferences of the present and all N future individuals is limited by β.
With some slight adjustments in stating our assumptions, the results of the preceding
sections can be directly transferred to this setup. This framework encompasses a broad
range of time structures, if we allow for correlations in φ(z1, . . . , zN ). The state of
nature and the types of individuals living in temporal proximity can be more strongly
correlated than those of individuals living in different millenia. This covers setups
with sequentially living generations and with overlapping generations.
We can also relax Assumption A6, that is, the exclusion of deterministic conflicts
of interest between future and present individuals, by viewing decisions as a two-
step process. In a first step, combinations of actions are calculated that assure that
each of these combinations does not harm the present whenever it does not decrease
expected future welfare, and vice versa. For example, in a typical resource-use-and-
investment-type problem, we can combine resource use, which benefits the present
(possibly) at the cost of the future, with a sufficient investment in capital stocks, which
benefits the future at the cost of the present. So, this first step handles deterministic
distribution conflicts. In a second step, we use the thus defined combined actions
as the set A and employ the methods advanced in the preceding sections to handle
the uncertainty of future preferences and outcomes. In this way, we can combine a
“conventional” sustainability analysis that proceeds under certainty with the above
risk-based approach.
In contrast, Assumptions A1–A4 as well as the convexity of A are essential for
our analysis. Most of our results hinge on the convexity of Ωα and Ξβ proven in
Propositions 1 and 4, respectively. If A or Z are not convex, then Ωα and Ξβ will
not be convex in general. For A, this is obvious because Ω1, Ξ1 = A. For Z there
is some leeway. If, e.g., Z consists only of two elements z1, z2 with probabilities p1
and (1 − p1), with p1 > (1 − p1), then Ωα and Ξβ will be convex for α, β < p1 if
preferences are convex w.r.t. a.5 Thus, most of our results can be transferred to such
a setup: A3 and A4 can be replaced by the convexity of preferences, A4* requires
preferences to be strictly convex, only the results based on A4** will have no direct
counterparts. However, for more general non-convex sets Z , it is often not possible
to transfer our results. For example, it is easy to find a set Z that consists of three
elements, so that Ωα and Ξβ are not convex.6 Thus, although there are cases in which
most of our results hold without Z being convex, these seem to be special cases.
5 If α is smaller than p1, we cannot have z1 ∈ Σ(a) for any a ∈ Ωα . So if a1, a2 ∈ Ωα , then z1 /∈ Σ(a1)
and z1 /∈ Σ(a2). By the convexity of preferences w.r.t. a, we have (λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, z1)  (a1, z1) and
thus λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 ∈ Ωα . The convexity of Ξβ can be shown similarly.
6 Consider the case, where a1, a2 ∈ Ωα , z1, z2 ∈ Σ(a1), z3 /∈ Σ(a1), z1, z3 ∈ Σ(a2), and z2 /∈ Σ(a2).
If (a1, z3)  (λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, z2) and (a2, z2)  (λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, z3) for some λ ∈]0, 1[, which is
possible even if preferences are convex w.r.t. a, we can have λa1 + (1 − λ)a2 /∈ Ωα .
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Assumption A4 is also essential for our analysis. If the distribution of future states
of nature and types is not unimodal, it is easily possible to construct examples in which
Ωα and Ξβ are not convex, so that our main results do not hold.
Altogether, the applicability of our results is not constrained by the two-person
setup but rather by our convexity assumptions and the restrictions on the likelihood
of future states and preferences. Whereas the convexity assumptions are standard in
economic analysis, the restriction on the probability distribution are clearly debatable.
But we think that they cover interesting cases. Often, it will be prudent to assume
that future individuals and future circumstances are close to present ones, so that the
likelihood of a future state-type combination decreases, the further this combination
deviates from the presently observed one. This corresponds closely to the main idea
behind the unimodality demanded in A4.
7 A numerical example
To illustrate our analysis, we consider a simple numerical example. Assume that the
present individual can bequest two stocks of capital, produced capital K and natural
capital N , to the future individual. The possible actions are changes to the capital
stocks with outcomes xN = (1 − aN )N0 and xK = s(1 + aK )K0, where N0 and
K0 denote the original values of the capital stocks. The random variable s describes
an uncertain change to the stock of produced capital. For example, it could represent
uncertainty w.r.t. to the efficiency of investments into man-made capital or an uncertain
growth or depreciation rate of produced capital. We could also introduce uncertainty
w.r.t. the change of the stock of natural capital. But this would only complicate the
example without allowing for additional insights.
Let the preferences of the future individual be given by a linear utility function
U (xK , xN , t) = xK + t xN . From the perspective of the present, the type t of the future
individual is a random variable. Furthermore, assume that s and t are independently
normally distributed with s ∼ N (µs, σs) and t ∼ N (µt , σt ). Finally, the set of feasible
actions A shall be given by A = {(aK , aN ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]}. Thus, any decline in
natural capital is irreversible.
Note that the above assumptions comply with A1–A4, and A4*. So we can apply
Propositions 1–6.
For the following numerical calculations, we use the following parameter values:
E (s) = 1.5, Var (s) = 1, E (t) = 1, Var (t) = 0.1. With these settings, the set Ωα can
be calculated and is depicted in Fig. 1 for different values of α. As this figure shows,
the sets of sustainable actions are convex and compact and are contained in each other
for increasing values of α, as Propositions 1–3 suggest.
We can also numerically characterize the trade-off between sustainability and effi-
ciency. Given that with the above specification of A, every action (aK , aN ) ∈ A with
aK < 1 and aN > 0, will be dominated by (1, 0) with a very high probability, we
introduce the additional constraint aK ≤ aN . This constraint limits the productivity of
natural capital in producing physical capital, which seems to be a reasonable descrip-
tion of most production processes. Furthermore, we assume that present preferences
are given by t0 = E (t) and that s0 = E (s).
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Fig. 1 The sets of sustainable actions for α = 0.75, 2.5, 5, 10, 20, 100%. Increasing values of α correspond
to a darker coloring
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Fig. 2 a The probabilities of being ex post inefficient (β) and of harming the future individual (α) for all
possible “most efficient sustainable actions.” b The set  of feasible combinations of (α, β)
Figure 2 depicts the risk of ex post inefficiency for all “most efficient sustainable
actions,” which are given by aK = aN with aN ∈ [0, 1], as well as the implied risk
of harming the future individual. As it shows, there is a genuine trade-off between
efficiency and sustainability. Also, the feasible combinations of sustainability and ex
post efficiency have the properties asserted by Proposition 5:  is a compact set with
a decreasing lower boundary β∗(α), and β∗(α) is strictly decreasing in α as long
as β∗(α) > βmin. The minimal achievable probability of being ex post inefficient is
βmin = 0 and it can be attained whenever the value of α is higher than ≈ 0.33.
Finally, it can be easily shown that all “most efficient sustainable actions,” that is,
all (aK , aN ) with aK = aN , lie on the efficient frontier, as Proposition 7 suggests.
In addition to illustrating the results of the preceding sections, this example also
serves to highlight the impact of uncertainty. The linear production and preference
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structure render the setup of this example favorable for the concept of weak sustain-
ability, which holds that preserving a suitable aggregate of natural and man-made
capital meets the requirement of sustainability. Under certainty, a linear aggregate
X = xK + xN would suffice to this end.
This does not hold under uncertainty. Maintaining a linear aggregate, that is, moving
on a line aK =aN , assures only a very modest requirement of sustainability. The curves
delineating the levels of sustainability as depicted in Fig. 1 show that at least a non-
linear aggregate is needed. Completely using up the natural capital stock (as allowed
by a linear aggregation rule) is only sustainable at α ≈ 33%, as Fig. 2 shows. So under
uncertainty, weak sustainability is indeed a rather weak obligation.
The other extreme—strong sustainability—would correspond to aN = 0. Accord-
ing to Fig. 2, this would imply a probability of about 70% of foregoing actions that
benefit everyone and would thus be highly inefficient. So without explicitly consider-
ing uncertainty, we are unable to reach a reasonable balance between the objectives
of sustainability and efficiency.
8 Conclusions
In this article, we have analyzed the question of how the long-run effects of present
actions on future individuals can be evaluated if there is uncertainty and if intergen-
erational welfare comparisons are not feasible. For this, we have used the concept of
sustainability advanced in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), which avoids such compar-
isons, and explored its relation to a corresponding concept of ex post efficiency. We
have provided a formal analysis of these concepts in a fairly general framework and
have covered many important points not addressed in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006),
like the structure of the sets of sustainable and efficient actions, the relation between
sustainability and efficiency, and the possibility to reduce the conflict between these
concepts by focusing on specific sustainable actions.
Our results show that it is not only possible but even advantageous to study ques-
tions of intertemporal distribution in a risk-based framework. Despite the compli-
cations arising from preference and outcome uncertainty, the basic elements of our
analysis, like the set of sustainable actions, the set of efficient actions, and the defini-
tion of “most efficient sustainable actions,” have convenient mathematical properties
that facilitate their use in a welfare analysis or in a social choice setup. Thus in this
framework, sustainability can easily be used as an a priori constraint in economic
analysis, as discussed in Howarth (1995) and Woodward (2000). Furthermore, due to
the uncertainty, we get a continuous dependency of the sets of allowable actions on
the levels of sustainability and efficiency and a continuous trade-off between these
requirements. Thus, the bivariate rankings (“sustainability” vs. “non-sustainability”)
of the deterministic case are changed to gradual characterizations. The incompatibility
of sustainability and efficiency is also replaced by a smooth trade-off that leaves ample
room for balancing these objectives.
Of course, these advantages come at some costs. We have used rather restric-
tive assumptions on the expectations concerning future preferences and outcomes
to assure that the distribution problem remains analytically tractable. We doubt that
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these assumptions can be significantly relaxed without sacrificing important proper-
ties of our framework. But they are substantially more general than the model of an
infinitely lived individual that is conventionally used in the sustainability discourse,
which assumes certainly known and unchanging preferences.
Another objection to our framework might be that it requires a choice between
sustainability and efficiency, that is, the level of sustainability (α) has to be set. Clearly,
this is a decision with important ethical implications. But although it might be hard to
settle on an ethically tenable level of α, this gradual choice should be much simpler,
at least from an ethical perspective, than the choice between sustainability without
efficiency and efficiency without sustainability that is implicit in most deterministic
frameworks.
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